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
THE
NATURE OF EMOTION

A THESIS


ACCEPTED BY THE FACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY
FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

DAVID IRONS, M.A.



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1897



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NOTE.—The references in the headlines to volume and number apply to the *Philosophical Review*, from which this thesis has been reprinted. The paging has been made consecutive throughout.

THE NATURE OF EMOTION.

THE object of this article is to set forth, as fully as space permits, the arguments in favor of a position which was mentioned incidentally in the January number of *Mind*, 1894. An inquiry into the nature of emotion cannot be deemed altogether superfluous at the present time. While most psychologists agree in maintaining that the phenomenon is explicable in terms of more primary aspects of mind, they appear to be wholly at variance in regard to the elements from which the supposed product is derived. Emotion has been described as 'a coalition of sensational effects with one another and with ideas' (Bain); organic sensation (Lange); pleasure-pain, pure and simple (Horwicz); a fusion of feeling and organic sensation (Külpe); pleasure-pain in combination with cognition (Lehmann, Höffding); a mass of sensuous and representative material with a predominant affective tone (Sully); tendency to activity (Godfernaux); a strong primary feeling of pleasure or pain, accompanied by a change in the course of ideas, and strengthened by the feelings associated with the ideas called up (Wundt); rank feeling of excitement (James¹); a complete psychosis involving cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation (Ward). Few writers, moreover, keep consistently to one point of view. Bain begins with a combination of various sensations and ideas, though the process of 'transformation' is admitted to be somewhat obscure. It appears, however, that the sensational stimulus is not always necessary, and that love, anger, and possibly fear, are "original fountains of sentiment or feeling."² Then emotion is classed, along with Intellect and Action, as one of the chief divisions of the mental powers.³ Finally, we find that particular emotions are defined in terms of pleasure-pain or impulse.⁴ Wundt, after expounding the theory already

¹ *Psychological Review*, i, 5, p. 525.

² *Emotions and Will* (3d ed.), p. 73.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 173, 177.

referred to, tells us that "the universal animal impulses are the earliest forms of emotion."¹ Höffding and others show the same tendency to depart from their original position, and to identify emotion more or less closely with impulse.²

The root of the trouble seems to be that emotion is explained away before a serious effort is made to ascertain with accuracy its real nature. In attempting to rectify this omission, we must begin with an examination of the fact as it appears in consciousness. It is evident that direct observation alone affords absolutely reliable information with regard to the qualitative distinctions of psychical states. We can, of course, supplement the results obtained by the use of this method. If, for example, the phenomenon under investigation not only seems fundamentally distinct from other aspects of mind, but is found in addition to have special conditions and effects, the testimony of introspection gains in objective validity. The application of the direct method to emotion is not so hopeless an undertaking as one is accustomed to imagine. All emotions do not involve commotion, and the less violent states can be accurately observed.

The simplest and most natural way of opening the inquiry will be to take concrete instances. When hate, for example, is aroused, into what constituents can the total consciousness of the moment be resolved? Under certain circumstances we can distinguish at once the cognition of the object, the pain of the injury or series of injuries, the awareness of certain organic disturbances, and an impulse towards a definite course of action. But the statement that we hate a person is not equivalent to the assertion that we are pained, know the cause, have various organic sensations, and feel impelled to act in a particular manner. Nor can hate be identified with any one of these elements or any combination of them. It implies that, in consequence of his actions with reference to us, we feel disposed towards some one in a certain way, and that, as a result of this feeling-attitude, actions of a special sort and these alone appeal

¹ *Menschen- und Thierseele* (1892), pp. 421-2; Creighton and Titchener's trans., pp. 386-7.

² *Psychology*, English trans., p. 235.

to us. The 'plain man,' in describing his state of mind, will say that he has bad feelings towards the individual, 'feels as if he could' inflict on him all manner of harm. Similarly, liking or affection for a person is not the idea of the object, the pleasure received, the expectation of further benefits, the awareness of various physical processes, or any combination of these. Here again we find a disposition towards the object which cannot be expressed in terms of mere intellectual or practical attitude. It is a feeling in reference to the object which is dependent on the intellectual attitude, and conditions the practical.

The observation of every emotional state will yield the same result, and we seem to have here a mental fact fundamentally distinct from the ultimate aspects of mind commonly recognized.¹ The existence and nature of this distinction will become more evident if we imagine an individual who is composed psychically of cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation. Such a being, when injured, might judge it advisable to retaliate, on the ground that if he does not he may be attacked again. Or, on general principles of abstract justice, he might deem it right to act towards the offender as the latter has acted towards him. But he would have no intense ill-feeling towards the aggressor, prompting him, apart from all deliberation and calculation of consequences, to adopt a particular line of conduct. His attitude would be similar to that of the ideal judge in the act of sentencing a criminal according to the general principles of law. We might assume that he had inherited an instinct of retaliation, or that he was so constituted as to take pleasure in giving pain in return for injury.² But in neither case would his action

¹ I am aware that few psychologists identify emotion with any one of the mental aspects mentioned above. This circumstance, indeed, justifies the present investigation. Taking my stand on the difference which is almost universally admitted, I seek to determine what it is before proceeding to estimate its significance.

² As a matter of fact, this pleasure can only be explained by reference to emotion. Retaliation is pleasant when hate is in the ascendant; otherwise there is no pleasure in the mere act of inflicting pain. The delight in cruelty as such is but an apparent exception to the rule. Habitual indulgence in an emotion will create a special tendency to action. If this propensity be firmly established, the

be accompanied by any malevolent feeling towards the object. Or, again, he might be moved to activity by the pain involved, but in that case he would seek immediate relief.¹ It cannot be asserted that he would invariably attain this end by inflicting suffering on the author of the pain ; but if he resorted to retaliation with this purpose in view, he would proceed with the same lack of ill-will which the hunter displays when he kills an animal to relieve the pangs of hunger.

As this imaginary individual would be destitute of all malevolent feeling, he would likewise be incapable of affection or gratitude. If he were agreeably affected by one of his fellows, he might cognize the pleasure-giving agent as a worthy kind of being, and return the favor from a sense of justice, or with a view to future benefits. His action, however, would not be prompted by any kindly disposition towards the individual concerned. He would regard the latter in a purely intellectual manner as a series of sensations involving, according to all probability, a personality like himself—a personality which has been the means of causing him enjoyment. On the other hand, he would turn on himself the same cold, cognitive gaze. His actions would give him pleasure if they harmonized with his interests or ideals, but there would be no responsive pride or self-complacency.

It is evident that a being of this sort would lack one of the springs of action which plays so large a part in our life, both

need of satisfying it will of itself be a sufficient stimulus to activity. Purely malevolent action, therefore, though it may seem to be independent of malevolent emotion, is yet derived from it. It can be shown also to bear traces of its origin, for (1) ill-feeling tends to appear during the course of the action, and (2) the individual who derives pleasure from cruelty is delighted if he can find or make some pretext which will rouse ill-feeling against his victim. The habit of malevolent action is strengthened also by such incidental accompaniments as the pleasures of power and contrast. If the position here advocated is not adopted, we must simply assume, as ultimate and inexplicable facts, pleasure in painning others and pleasure in giving pleasure. This in itself is rather a lame conclusion, and it becomes still more unsatisfactory when we note that it renders insoluble the problem of explaining why one of these principles comes into play at one time and its opposite at another.

¹ In regard to this statement with reference to pain-prompted action, see Ward, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xx, p. 71; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, i, p. 280, etc.

directly and indirectly. And though he might perform the actions to which emotions prompt, he would never be driven along, regardless of everything, simply because one course alone seemed to satisfy his feeling at the moment. Further, there would always be this fundamental difference between him and the actual human being, that his attitude to other persons and things could only be intellectual and practical.¹ Since pleasure-pain ends in the self, and has no outward reference,² when he faced a person or event he could only cognize the fact in a certain way, and act accordingly. The nature of the cognitive attitude would undoubtedly be influenced by the pleasure-pain received, but it would still remain purely cognitive.

When we thus eliminate everything but cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, the distinctive character of emotion comes to light more prominently. I have used the term 'feeling-attitude' to indicate, not to define, this apparently unique aspect of mind. The word 'feeling' expresses subjectivity and diffuseness. Emotion is subjective in much the same sense as pleasure-pain. It is a centrally initiated reaction, however, while the latter is pure receptivity. Briefly, the one is subjectivity as reaction; the other is subjectivity as receptivity. The word 'attitude' is employed to mark this distinction, and to emphasize the fact that emotion, in virtue of its character as reaction, has what might be termed 'objective reference.' We may say, then, that emotion is the subjective response which appears when we react in view of a situation instead of being passively affected by it. This response is not a mere impulse or tendency to act; it is a mood or state of feeling in regard to the object, on account of which special modes of conduct appeal to us with a force they do not possess on other occasions. Impulses and volitions arise in consequence, for particular motor-ideas thus become dominant. These ideas gain this ascendancy,

¹ This would be more generally acknowledged if psychologists would substitute their various formulas for the ordinary terms used in reference to the emotions. The fact is surreptitiously introduced under cover of the word, and statements thus appear plausible that would otherwise seem rather strained.

² Bradley, *Mind*, 1888, p. 3; Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 234.

however, simply because they are in harmony with that phase of subjectivity which is prominent at the time.¹

In order to determine the nature of emotion more accurately we shall contrast it with the other aspects of mind in turn. In this connection cognition can be treated briefly. A cognitive state is not merely a subjective event with a place in the series of psychological occurrences. It reports the existence and nature of something, and thus has a reference beyond itself. This reference is its most prominent feature, and its factual nature as a psychological event falls into the background. Emotion, it is evident, has not the objective reference which pertains to cognition. It has the outward direction which is characteristic of all reaction. Moreover, it is not so much an isolated activity as the actual being of the individual in a certain phase or aspect. For this reason its factual character as a psychological event is obtruded on consciousness. Naturally this awareness of subjectivity is not so strong as in the case of pleasure-pain, for there is an outward direction and a fixing of the attention on some object. This consciousness is always present, however, except in a few exceptional cases, and even then the obliteration is but momentary.

This leads naturally to the discussion of the contrast between emotion and pleasure-pain, for the latter is also subjective in a special sense. It is pure receptivity, however, and thus lacks that outward direction which emotion as reaction possesses. It is mere result, an effect coming from the object and ending in the self. Emotion, on the contrary, is an attitude we adopt. We are pained or pleased *by* something, and have emotion *towards* something. The distinction is embodied in the structure of language.

That emotion has an outward reference has frequently been admitted,² but the significance of the fact has not been fully

¹ What the agent cannot do in 'cold blood' seems to him the only thing to do when his passions are aroused.

² Cf. Hume, *Treatise* (Green & Grose ed.), ii, pp. 78, 121; Höffding, *Psychology*, p. 234; James, *Principles of Psychology*, ii, p. 313; Lehmann, *Hauptgesetze des Gefühlslebens*, pp. 19, 116-7.

recognized. It is often supposed, for instance, that a combination of cognition and pleasure-pain explains everything. If simple coexistence be all that is meant, it would be easy to show, on the evidence of introspection, that emotion is not merely the simultaneous presence of the elements in question. On this view, moreover, it is difficult to explain how pleasure-pain and cognition can be present together while emotion is absent, for this is the state of affairs when we are 'hurt,' *i.e.*, pained but not angry, at the conduct of a friend. If, on the other hand, some process is implied, it would surely be better to say that when the factors mentioned are present they condition the appearance of something else. If we treat pleasure-pain and cognition, not as antecedents or conditions, but as constituents which enter into some quasi-chemical combination, emotion would have a double claim to be regarded as a unique element of consciousness. As product it would have a character all its own, and the process would be miraculous.

That emotion is a central reaction, and in this respect different from pleasure-pain, is another position which has been admitted¹ without a full appreciation of its consequences. As it is of vital importance, it will be well to indicate the arguments in its favor. In the first place, it is obvious that emotion is subject to that law of activity which we call the principle of habit. The more frequently an emotion is indulged in, the smaller is the stimulus necessary to call it forth. When we say a person is timorous, irascible, or affectionate, we mean that he has a certain emotional habit, in virtue of which fear, anger, or affection is readily aroused. Such habits constitute the temperament or disposition of the individual, and may be acquired or inherited. As temperament is simply tendency to reaction, it is easy to see how it can be inherited. Now pleasure-pain does not become habitual, in the sense that it becomes by repetition more easily excited. On the contrary, it comes under the influence of the principle of habituation (which is a very different thing), and thus tends to become weaker when repeated.

Further, while the circumstances are in themselves emotion-

¹ Cf. Sully, *Human Mind*, ii, pp. 91, 93.

ally exciting, emotion may be inhibited, or at all events appreciably affected, by a consideration of the propriety of indulging it. Anger may be checked or totally inhibited by a perception of the consequences it might entail, and any passion tends to subside if the agent feels that he is making himself ridiculous. On the other hand, no abstract reflections on the uselessness of the thing will get rid of the pain of toothache, if the nervous agitation continues. No general consideration of the evil results of pain will affect the disagreeable effect produced by an ill-proportioned building so long as the ugly object remains within the field of vision. We can influence pleasure-pain only by dealing with its conditions, whereas we can restrain emotion when its normal conditions are present. And if certain points of view have become habitual, certain emotions will be habitually suppressed on all ordinary occasions. It is scarcely necessary to point out that a merely passive effect cannot be controlled in this way, and that a reaction alone can be affected by a perception of the consequences it involves. In view of these facts, it is significant to observe that we feel more responsible for emotion than for pleasure-pain. We may be ashamed of being angry, but we are never really ashamed of being pained. This is inexplicable save on the assumption that emotion is reaction, for we can identify ourselves only with our own activity, not with an effect imposed on us from without. It is worthy of note in this connection that individuals differ much more in emotion than in hedonic sensibility. Finally, attention may be drawn to certain phrases and modes of speech. We talk of 'instinctive'¹ fear or dislike, 'involuntary' or 'grudging' admiration, 'unmotivated' hate, 'unbridled' passion, 'outburst' of emotion. This language would be absurd if emotion were not a reaction, and it is absurd if applied to pleasure-pain. We cannot speak of an 'unmotivated' pain, or an 'outburst' of pleasure. We are justified in concluding, therefore, that pleasure-pain is simply the way in which things affect us, while

¹ It is the feeling which is instinctive, not any action. The feeling may arise instinctively in circumstances which render a new line of action necessary. In such cases, of course, there can be no instinctive action, and in other cases all action appropriate to the emotion may be inhibited.

emotion is the manner in which we react. The latter is an element of our own character, while the former is mainly an expression of the psychical nature which we share with others.

If we turn now to the conditions of the two phenomena we shall find that they are entirely distinct, as might indeed be inferred from the results already attained. Pleasure and pain depend upon harmony¹ and discord respectively. Lehmann maintains that anything causes pain which is in conflict with the conditions of mental or physical existence, and that the opposite holds in the case of pleasure.² This is true, but it does not go far enough. Many things affect us agreeably or the reverse, merely in virtue of their relation to the aspect of our nature which is for the time being in evidence. If we are gloomy, gayety displeases us; and the same action will cause pleasure or pain according as hate or kindly feeling is dominant. As Shaftesbury puts it, "the man in anger has a different happiness from the man in love."³

While mere discord and harmony are thus the conditions of pleasure-pain, they do not determine emotion. Whatever is at variance with the individual's interests or wishes causes pain, but anger does not appear until he feels that he is 'injured.' Any bodily disorder is painful, but the sense of danger must be present before fear is aroused. Admiration and contempt imply the recognition of worth and its opposite respectively. Hate presupposes that the object of the feeling is cognized as a hostile personality. A situation becomes emotionally effective, therefore, only if it is viewed under some general aspect. The detail as such, while possessing hedonic potentialities, is irrelevant. That emotion depends upon the point of view adopted, is obscured by the fact that it may become habitual. It may thus take the form of a reflex response to presentation, and, in extreme cases, may burst forth without any external provocation whatever.

¹ 'Harmony' is taken in its widest sense, to include all that is not discordant. Cf. Bradley, *Mind*, 1888, p. 7.

² *Die Hauptgesetze des Gefühlslebens*, pp. 150-1.

³ *Characteristics* (5th ed.), i, p. 296.

A variety of emotions is possible, therefore, in a situation that remains objectively the same. The sight of suffering causes pain, but, while the disagreeable effect remains, anger, pity, or contempt may arise according to the way in which the situation is regarded. Similarly while defeat is, and remains, unpleasant, we may admire an opponent if we attend to the skill displayed, or dislike him if he appears to us merely as the cause of a disagreeable result. Of course these different points of view bring new elements of discord and harmony into prominence, and thus, in an incidental and secondary way, condition pleasure-pain as well. On the other hand, they influence emotion directly. In the one case, they change the object which stands in relation to us, and thus indirectly affect its hedonic power; in the other, they supply a reason and justification for a particular reaction.

We have seen that an emotion may be inhibited, by a vivid perception of the effects it might produce, even when its normal conditions are in operation. This possibility of direct control does not exist in the case of pleasure-pain; and it thus illustrates in a striking way the difference in the conditions of the two phenomena. In certain cases, also, an emotion can be accounted for only on the ground that a need was felt for reacting in that way. As Bain remarks, "the irascible temper in a state of surcharge does not need an actual offender";¹ "the temperament overflowing with tender emotion finds many things to love."² It is important also to note that the same consideration may affect emotion and pleasure-pain in different ways. That one has been injured by a friend, is a reflection that may check anger or ill-feeling, while adding to the pain. Finally, as we have already pointed out, emotion itself may be in one sense a condition of pleasure-pain. It is at times the self in relation to which things are harmonious or discordant.

Since hedonic effect is determined by harmony and discord, and the latter can differ only in intensity, it is natural to suppose that pleasure and pain have only quantitative differences. This is the position which is most generally accepted by psychologists

¹ *Emotions and Will*, p. 189.

² *Ibid.*, p. 281.

at the present day.¹ On the other hand, evidence can be adduced to prove that emotion exhibits qualitative distinctions. First there is the testimony of introspection, and in a case like this, as Külpe maintains,² it is to introspection that the final appeal must be made. So far as direct observation is concerned, it may confidently be asserted that fear, hate, contempt, are as distinct from one another as blue, red, green. In both cases the assertion of qualitative distinction rests on the same basis, and has the same justification. Further, while every pain may be set down to discord and every pleasure to harmony, the primary emotions must be referred to conditions that are in each case specifically distinct. The recognition of worth, for instance, is entirely different from the sense of injury or the consciousness of danger. What holds for the conditions holds for the effects. While pleasures or pains always prompt to activity of the same sort,³ each primary emotion gives rise to a special mode of behavior. There is nothing in common between the actions due to anger, fear, contempt, admiration, hate, and affection. It is also noteworthy that the different emotions are marked off by special names, while the various pleasures and pains are not thus distinguished from one another. Ordinary language is not an infallible guide in matters of detail, but when it presents us with a broad general fact of this sort its testimony cannot be entirely ignored. It is scarcely necessary to add that emotions cannot be classed simply as pleasurable or painful. No emotion has the same hedonic character throughout. A certain degree of fear is stimulating, and therefore pleasurable; and an outburst of rage may be distinctly agreeable.⁴ Affection may be painful in the sense that it may be accompanied by greater pain than pleasure.⁵ While hate in its initial stages involves a large element of pain, it may in the end become exclusively pleasurable. 'The thought of revenge is sweet,' especially when

¹ Cf. Ward, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xx, p. 71; Bradley, *Mind*, 1888, p. 2; Sully, *Human Mind*, ii, p. 7; Lehmann, *Hauptgesetze des Gefühllebens*, p. 124; Külpe, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, p. 246. ² *Grundriss*, p. 333.

³ Cf. Ward, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xx, p. 71.

⁴ Sully, *Human Mind*, ii, pp. 94, 95.

⁵ Cf. Horwicz, *Psychologische Analysen*, ii, pp. 448, 460.

backed by the consciousness of power, and the emotion heightens general activity and is thus in itself a source of pleasure.

We may now consider the influence which pleasure-pain and emotion exert on action. If a state of consciousness is pleasant, we seek to retain it; if painful, we seek to get rid of it.¹ When we act *from* pleasure or pain, we act in reference *to* them. An effect on our own subjective state is invariably the end in view. Can we apply this in the case of emotion? Is vengeance desired because it puts an end to hate? Can a parent be said to make sacrifices for his children's benefit in order to maintain his affection for them? Is it true that a patriot lays down his life for the purpose of preserving his love of country? This seems somewhat absurd, and the reason is not hard to find. We have already pointed out that an emotion has no constant hedonic character. It may be pleasurable at one time and painful at another. *Yet the action which it prompts is always the same.* Whether hate be painful or the reverse, it always impels the agent to actions of hostility. This proves conclusively enough that emotion is a principle of action entirely different from pleasure-pain in its mode of operation. The distinction is specially prominent when the two principles come into direct conflict. Pity is thus at variance with the pain which is always associated with it. The former directs attention to the disagreeable object, while the latter moves us in the opposite direction, and impels us to banish the unpleasing spectacle from consciousness. Moreover, the intensity and extent of emotion-prompted action are often out of all proportion to the pleasure-pain involved. The actions of hate and affection alike usually bear no quantitative relation to the amount of pleasure or pain received or expected.²

It is not difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the distinction which thus obtrudes itself. Pleasure-pain is purely subjective, concentrates attention on itself, and naturally enough arouses activity dealing with the hedonic condition of the agent.

¹ Cf. Ward, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xx, p. 71; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, i, p. 280; Höfding, *Psychology*, p. 274; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics* (4th ed.), pp. 44, 45.

² Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 50.

Emotion, on the contrary, is an attitude or disposition towards something, directs attention outward, and therefore impels to action that has reference to an object. When the agent is entirely under the influence of emotion, he acts as he feels disposed towards the object, just because he is so disposed, and for no other reason. He is concerned with the object alone. The subject is in the background, the object all in all. The malevolent passions are as disinterested as the others. We 'lose ourselves' in hate as in love. When hate is dominant the conduct of the individual is unselfish in precisely the same sense as it is unselfish when he is impelled by the opposite emotion. He may know that he is acting contrary to his own interests, but that does not affect him so long as hate retains its power.¹

Several writers have emphasized this characteristic of emotional action. Shaftesbury contends that interest does not govern the world, and that it is hard to believe that nothing is done in pure good-nature or kindness.² Hutcheson maintains that there is something in our nature which determines us to actions "without any conception of them as good or as the means of preventing evil."³ He analyzes anger, and finds in it, besides the desire of obtaining reparation of the wrong and security for the future, "a propensity to occasion misery to the offender, a determination to violence, even when there is no intention of any good to be obtained or evil avoided by this violence." Tucker does not question the fact that emotion-prompted action is disinterested, but seeks to explain it in conformity with his hedonistic principles.⁴ Bain is very explicit on the point. "When a burst of strong emotion possesses the mind . . . the usual course of volition is manifestly here perverted and paralyzed by some foreign influence."⁵ This means that "the passions urge us on apparently without regard either to pain or to pleasure."⁶ In discussing the propriety of arousing

¹ This should be taken into account whenever the origin of 'altruistic' conduct is under discussion.

⁴ *Light of Nature*, ch. xxi.

² *Characteristics*, i, pp. 115, 116.

⁵ *Emotions and Will*, p. 380.

³ *The Passions*, sec. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

passion for some noble end, he says: "As regards the work to be done, nothing can be more effectual; as regards the happiness of the agent, the immolation is often remorseless."¹

We may now summarize the results obtained by this discussion of the contrast between pleasure-pain and emotion. Both are essentially subjective, but the former is an effect imposed from without, the latter is reaction. Consequently, while the one is mere result, ending in the self, the other has outward reference. The primary emotions are qualitatively distinct, but pleasures and pains differ from one another in quantity alone. The two phenomena are further distinguished by differences in conditions and in effect on action. We might add in conclusion that they seem mutually exclusive, and in extreme cases indeed absolutely incompatible. In an emotional paroxysm we are no longer conscious of pleasure or pain, and it is impossible to suffer an agony of pain and be emotionally excited at the same time.

The relation between emotion and conation has already been indicated. When an emotion is aroused, some special line of conduct appeals to the agent with peculiar force, and a particular motor idea thus gains a prominent place in consciousness. If this idea becomes dominant, and if no obstacles of any sort intervene, it is succeeded at once by the sensations attending the performance of the action. If any hindrance has to be overcome, an 'impulse' to action is felt; if the obstacle be insurmountable, either temporarily or permanently, desire emerges.

It is with these occasional antecedents of action that emotion has been frequently confounded. It is evident, however, that when the emotion-prompted action follows instantly neither desire nor impulse can appear. In such cases emotion is present when impulse and desire are absent. The latter, moreover, will be evoked in all cases where activity is impeded or inhibited. They may thus be present when emotion is absent, for the movement that encounters resistance may be determined by a fixed idea with no emotional accompaniment. In short, the

¹ *Emotions and Will*, p. 394.

conditions are not the same, and indeed emotion may itself be one of the conditions which give rise to impulse or desire. The sense of danger causes fear, but there is no 'desire' or 'impulse' to escape until the action is in some way obstructed, and the dominant motor idea which the tendency to action presupposes can only be accounted for by reference to the emotion. If we examine the phenomena as they appear in consciousness, the distinction between them becomes very marked. Feeling-attitude, or the way in which we are disposed towards some person or event, has nothing in common with that peculiar consciousness of striving to do something which constitutes impulse; and it is immaterial whether the latter be regarded as muscular sensation or as the immediate awareness of outgoing activity. Nor can emotion be identified with that state of conscious want which we call 'desire.' The latter is a practical attitude towards some end which we have the inclination, but not the power, to realize immediately; the former is the feeling in reference to some object regarded as mere existence, not as end to be realized. Desire thus involves a sense of conflict between the real and the ideal condition of the self, while emotion is, for the time, the real self with which things are felt to be in harmony or conflict. It must also be noted that emotion admits of qualitative distinctions, whereas every impulse is the same in kind, whatever be its source or object, and the same holds true of desire.

The results which we have reached are: (1) that emotion is introspectively distinct from cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation; (2) that, in addition to its unique character as a conscious fact, it has special conditions and effects. It is thus not merely unanalyzable, but also irreducible, and must therefore be regarded as an ultimate and primary aspect of mind. The conclusion will appear more plausible after the various methods of accounting for the emotional *quale* have been examined. This criticism of current theories, however, must be reserved for another occasion.

THE NATURE OF EMOTION. II.

THE present article will be devoted to a critical examination of current theories of emotion. After discussing the identification of emotion with pleasure-pain and with conation, we shall take up the James theory in its various forms. We shall then deal with the view that excitement is emotion, or, at all events, an essential element of it; and finally consider the theory that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain and cognition. It is not possible to classify the various theories in a perfectly systematic way, but under the heads we have given the views of the different writers can be arranged conveniently enough for the purposes of exposition, and with a rough approximation to accuracy. In this article, as in the previous one, the argument would be clearer if the term 'emotion' were less ambiguous. Several states usually classed as emotions, surprise and melancholy for instance, do not seem to me to possess the true emotional characteristic. I should restrict the term to such phenomena as fear, anger, hate, affection, admiration, and contempt, which are distinctively feelings-in-reference-to something. It can be maintained, I think, that this limitation of meaning is in principle defensible. There are certain states which every one would call emotions, and these possess a peculiar character. The states which I exclude do not have this character, and can usually be explained as complexes of various elements. Their exclusion can be defended on the ground that if the word 'emotion' is to have any definite meaning it ought to be applied to phenomena that have a common attribute; and there is nothing arbitrary in the selection of the attribute, for the one which I have taken as the connotation of the word is the characteristic feature of all those states to which the term 'emotion' is unhesitatingly applied by every psychologist.

I. Horwicz has worked out in great detail the theory that emotion is pleasure-pain as such, and he may therefore be taken as the representative of this point of view. According to this

writer, the pleasures and pains of sense, 'moral' feelings (hate, love, pride, gratitude, contempt, etc.), æsthetic, intellectual, and religious feelings, differ from one another only in degree of complexity. The higher feelings develop out of the sense pleasures and pains,¹ though the latter are themselves not altogether simple.² The primary feelings differ qualitatively from one another.³ They combine to form new feelings, and each complex thus formed is a unity which possesses a character peculiar to itself.⁴ The lower combinations in turn enter as constituents into higher complexes, and the latter again are synthetic unities with specific qualities of their own.

If this account of the matter be correct, it is obvious that there must be an indefinite number of possible combinations. It might, however, be maintained (1) that pleasure-pain admits of quantitative distinctions alone, and consequently that there is no multiplicity of qualitatively different elements capable of forming a large number of new combinations; (2) that, as a matter of fact, there is no such multiplicity of concrete 'feelings' as our author postulates. At all events, if the different emotions are simply combinations of various feelings, they derive their character from the elements combined, and Horwicz must prove that the constituents are in each case approximately the same. It is evident, however, from the admissions which he is forced to make, that he cannot do this.⁵ The difficulty becomes all the greater when we remember that he recognizes that each emotion is not a loose conglomerate, but a definite unity with a special quality of its own. A more serious objection is brought to light in the author's discussion of love. He describes this state as a highly organized complex, which is formed by the combination of all the feelings excited by the person who is the object of the emotion.⁶ Despite the qualitative differences of its components, this complex forms a unitary feeling with a unique character, and it has always the same pleasure-pain coloring, although its elements may vary in this respect. The

¹ *Psychologische Analysen*, ii, 2, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 467.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 22.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 368, 467.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 366-7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

quality of the constituents makes no difference, nor their character as pleasures or pains.¹ Omitting the first complication, let us direct attention to the second. Horwicz maintains that so long as the feelings aroused by the object of the emotion are strong, it is indifferent whether they be pleasures or pains. Strong pains as well as strong pleasures lead to love;² and yet this emotion is a strong pleasure.³ In short, love is a strong pleasure, and it may be produced by a combination of pleasures and pains, or may be mainly, if not wholly, a synthesis of pains. Horwicz says emphatically that the highest pleasure may be felt when the elements entering into the complex consist of pain pure and simple.⁴ This view becomes still more paradoxical when we learn that, though the strong pleasure which constitutes love may arise from pure pain, it is unthinkable that the strong pain which is called 'hate' should result from pure pleasure.⁵ This statement shows that the author has felt the need of finding some distinction between love and hate; but even if the assertion could be accepted, it would in certain cases be absolutely impossible to say why the resultant should be love and not hate. This position, however, does not call for detailed criticism; it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the pleasure-pain theory of emotion. Moreover, it cannot be regarded as a gratuitous eccentricity on the part of a particular writer, for, if emotion be taken to be the sum of the pleasure-pain elements which are present at the moment, this is the view which must be adopted, since the elements in question vary in hedonic coloring with circumstances. Horwicz has demonstrated that emotion cannot be regarded as a synthesis of this sort by carrying out the theory, in one instance, to its logical consequences. It is also interesting to note that those who identify emotion with pleasure-pain are logically bound to accept the paradoxical conclusion which Horwicz has reached, whether they assert or deny that pleasure-pain contains qualitative distinctions.

2. Though emotion is frequently identified more or less closely

¹ *Psychologische Analysen*, ii, 2, p. 460.

² *Ibid.*, p. 448.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

with conation,¹ this is usually an inconsistency rather than an explicit theory. In Godfernaux's case, however, this identification seems to be the logical outcome of the author's general position. Emotion is regarded by this writer as the conscious accompaniment of those definite 'tendencies' which are gradually evolved out of the primary undifferentiated motor-continuum; and so far his view seems to be similar to that of Mr. Marshall. He goes on to add, however, that if a 'tendency' satisfies itself immediately, without meeting resistance of any kind, the whole process remains unconscious. Only when the 'tendency' is impeded does it become a conscious fact, and it then appears as emotion.² As we have seen, it is precisely under these circumstances that impulse and desire arise,³ and it can be shown, I think, that emotion has other conditions. Emotion may be present when there is no obstacle in the way of action; and an obstruction, when it exists, seems to have nothing whatever to do with the origin of the emotion. Hate cannot be said to appear only when we are seized with a malevolent impulse which cannot be realized in action. It seems to depend solely on the fact that an individual is cognized as a hostile personality, and it may surely arise when there is no obstacle in the path of malevolent action.

Moreover, when emotion is present, it seems to be the condition which we must presuppose in order to explain why a certain tendency exists at that time. It is a state of mind in which certain modes of conduct appeal to us with peculiar force, in which, accordingly, certain activities or tendencies to activity have their source. This is proved by the fact that in certain cases, if the emotion be left out of account, the behavior of the individual is totally inexplicable. If the emotion of pity did not intervene, what connection could there be between the perception of the fact that others suffer and the impulsive good-will which frequently follows it? This perception is accompanied

¹ The use of this word, of course, does not imply any theory of 'will.' It is necessary, under any circumstances, to have a special name for the group of phenomena to which impulse, desire, etc., belong.

² *Le sentiment et la pensée*, pp. 133-4.

³ "The Nature of Emotion," *PHIL. REV.*, May, 1897, p. 255.

by pain, and it is not easy to understand how 'natural selection' or 'the experience of the race' could explain how we come to have a tendency to do good to those who pain us. We do not act merely to relieve our own pain, and, if this were the end in view, we should in the majority of cases simply turn away, and the pity 'instinct,' even in its outward aspect as an external action, would have but a slight chance of being formed. This raises the whole question of the origin of these instinctive tendencies which Godfernaux and others simply assume to exist. We cannot enter into this here, and a full discussion of the point is not necessary for our present purposes. It is evident that emotion cannot be identified with conation if it must be presupposed to explain the appearance of certain tendencies at certain times, and if, in some instances at least, the existence of these tendencies cannot be accounted for unless by reference to some emotion.

That emotion cannot be a combination of pleasure-pain and conation is an obvious corollary from all that has been said. Certain phenomena of conation imply as their condition a conscious fact which is distinct from pleasure-pain and cognition; and Horwicz's results prove that pleasure-pain is a mere concomitant of emotion. It may be well to bring out the latter point more explicitly. In the first place, the hedonic character of the total state may vary, while the emotion remains the same. Hate accompanied by pleasure and hate accompanied by pain are evidently identical, for the action is in each case precisely the same. In the second place, it is not necessary that there should be any pleasure-pain at all. The only thing that is indispensable is that the situation or object be cognized in a certain way,¹ and, as a matter of fact, when an emotion becomes an instinctive response to presentation it may appear before the hedonic effect has time to make itself felt. It is unquestionably true that in certain cases the pleasure-pain received does affect the direction of attention, but this is only an indirect influence which it exerts. It is equally certain that the aspect of the situation which affects us most strongly in the way of pleasure-

¹ "The Nature of Emotion," PHIL. REV., May, 1897, p. 250.

pain may be irrelevant so far as emotional reaction is concerned. We may feel defeat most keenly and yet admire the opponent who inflicted it, instead of having ill-will towards him. Hence, apart from the fact that certain actions and tendencies imply the existence of something different from pleasure-pain and cognition, emotion cannot be analyzed into conation and pleasure-pain, since the latter can be proved to be a mere concomitant.

3. We may now proceed to consider the general standpoint with which the names of James and Lange are so intimately associated. Although this theory has already been discussed at great length, it has affected modern psychology so deeply that it cannot be omitted from this general survey. The critics of this position are usually so much impressed by it that they lay a new emphasis on the part played by organic sensations in giving character to the emotional 'complex,' and sometimes, as in the case of Lehmann, they make even greater concessions. It is important, therefore, to determine the exact relation between emotion and the organic disturbance, and this can best be accomplished by a thorough examination of the James-Lange position. It is not possible at present to criticise fully the different forms which the theory has assumed in different hands, and it is not always easy to know precisely where the various writers stand. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a more or less general discussion of the following contentions: (1) that emotion is organic sensation;¹ (2) that it is caused by the physical disturbance; (3) that it is composed of organic sensation and pleasure-pain. The original theory was a combination of the first two theses, but, as the latter have since been dissociated, there is no impropriety in dealing with them separately.²

Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether emotion can be identified with organic sensation. No one cares to deny

¹ We shall use this phrase in place of the ambiguous expression, 'feeling of bodily change.' There seems little doubt that some writers, at least, identify emotion and organic sensation. Lehmann, Ribot, Marty, and others have interpreted James in this way, and Lange uses the word *Wahrnehmung*. In any case, it is better to discuss this view by itself, and then determine whether the addition of pleasure-pain makes any difference.

² Cf. *Mind*, 1895, pp. 92-93.

that, when a strong emotion is aroused, the sense of organic disturbance is usually a prominent feature of the total consciousness of the moment. The only question can be whether this by itself can give the peculiar emotional tone to our mental state. Those who answer this question in the affirmative reduce emotion to a form of cognition, and it is not obvious how the organic sensation in question can be both cognition and emotion at the same time. Nor is it clear how cognition as such should be pale, cold, and unemotional, while this particular form of it should be emotion. It is true that the sense of organic disturbance usually involves, or is accompanied by, emotion, but it is a fact of the same order as the sense of physical existence, which the individual always possesses, and in itself is not emotional. The statement that A hates B is not equivalent to the assertion that A is aware of certain changes in his own body. A's cognition of his own physical condition has nothing in common with that feeling towards B which is the characteristic feature of his consciousness at the time, nor does it explain why A 'feels as if he could' do B all manner of harm. Indeed, the supporters of the James' theory frequently deny that there is any connection between emotion and action. The former, they declare, is simply the reflex in consciousness of activities otherwise originated, and this is doubtless the logical statement of their position. It would be hard to prove, however, that emotion has no influence on action, and, if this be asserted, some attempt must be made to explain the origin of certain actions and tendencies. This, as we have already pointed out, is no easy task. And, even if the active tendencies could be accounted for, the nature of emotional impulses would still present a serious difficulty. Why, for instance, should a being without hate, as we understand it, feel impelled to injure the hated individual, regardless of all consequences to himself? The followers of James will find it difficult to explain this phenomenon on evolutionary principles or in any other way. If, on the other hand, they assert that they can legitimately postulate emotion as a factor in conduct, they must show some connection between certain organic sensations and certain courses of action. We

may add that each emotion is a single pulse of consciousness; it is a reaction, and possesses a unitary character in consequence. Hence it cannot possibly be analyzed into a multiplicity of organic sensations, occupying at different times the focus of consciousness, and localized at different parts of the body.

These objections follow, for the most part, from the position adopted in the previous article in this REVIEW,¹ but other criticisms might be made which do not imply any special theory. In the first place, emotion may arise when the amount of organic sensation is so small that it approaches the vanishing point. This is proved by the fact that a person may be almost entirely anaesthetic and yet manifest the usual emotions. Two cases of this description are on record: one cited by Professor James, and the other by Dr. Worcester.² When anaesthesia is accompanied by emotional apathy, it is evident from the instances brought forward that the general mental condition is so affected that objects are either not perceived at all, or, if perceived, have no significance. In these circumstances it is not wonderful that emotion disappears, for in a similar psychical condition this result would follow even in an individual who was not anaesthetic.³ It may be that, in the case of those who have not been anaesthetic from birth, 'reproduced organic sensations' play a part, but these cannot well be identified with the vivid living emotion. Moreover, in normal life emotion is often strong when the bodily sensations are comparatively weak and unimportant. In the case of pride, admiration, and contempt the amount of physical disturbance is no measure of the strength of the emotion. Many emotions which move us most profoundly are accompanied by slight organic excitement. It will be found, I believe, that in many instances the bodily changes vary to a large extent with the practical demands of the situation. The organic perturbation tends to become very strong when immediate action of great importance to the individual is necessary; it is not usually so prominent when prompt action is not vitally

¹ May, 1897, pp. 242-256.

² *Principles of Psychology*, ii, pp. 455-6; *Monist*, 1892-3, pp. 293-4.

³ Cf. "The Physical Basis of Emotion," *Mind*, 1895, pp. 96-97.

essential. The difference between anger and hate in this respect is very instructive. It is worthy of note that the advocates of the view we are discussing lay most stress on emotions arising under circumstances which render immediate activity necessary.

On the other hand, a large number of organic sensations may be present without affecting the emotional tone in any way. An athlete who engages in a contest without sufficient preparation is usually in a position to cognize a complicated series of physical changes,—trembling, respiratory disturbances, heart-throbbing, and visceral changes generally. Yet these seem emotionally non-significant, for they remain the same whether he is glad, sad, angry, envious, proud, ashamed, or simply too tired to care for anything. In such cases, we are told, the emotional diffusive wave is not complete; that is, certain organic sensations are still lacking. But this reply only touches one part of the difficulty, and it must also be pointed out that the emotional wave does not seem very diffused in the case of admiration, contempt, etc. Further, it is not obvious why the awareness of so much organic change should be simply organic sensation, while the awareness of so much more should be emotion.

Other objections come to light when we inquire into the causes of the bodily changes which are indiscriminately massed together under the ambiguous and misleading phrase 'emotional expression.' These changes may be divided into: (1) those which originally served some purpose or had some connection with mental conditions;¹ (2) those which are due to the fact that energy has been aroused and must find an outlet. The second class comprises all those phenomena which can be explained by the principle which Darwin called 'the direct action of the nervous system.' Darwin, as Ward remarks,² does not seem to have fully appreciated the range of this principle, but even in his treatment of the subject one cannot fail to be impressed with its importance. It has been emphasized by Spencer,

¹ The phenomena which are explained by the principle of 'analogous-feeling stimuli' would come under the latter head. Though they never served any purpose, in the strict sense of the word, there was a reason for their adoption.

² *Ency. Brit.*, xx, p. 72, Note.

James, Wundt, Külpe, Sergi, Mosso, and others, and the tendency of late years has been to lay greater stress upon it. There can be little doubt that by extending the scope of this principle we attain a truer conception of the nature and origin of 'emotional expression' in general. It seems much better, for instance, to regard the respiratory changes in anger and fear as the results of actually present stimuli, than to accept Spencer's view that they are organic reminiscences of the pantings of a man in combat or in flight.

The principle has been formulated by Darwin as follows: "When the sensorium is strongly excited nerve force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain directions depending on the connection of the nerve cells and partly on habit."¹ Whenever emotion is accompanied by strong bodily agitation, therefore, it will be found that nerve force is liberated in greater quantities than can be used up in action. The excess must find an outlet; hence it spreads through the body, causing a marked organic disturbance. In this way we can account for trembling, laughing, weeping, and other glandular changes, respiratory changes, alterations in the heart-beat, visceral disturbances generally. The only elements in 'emotional expression,' in fact, which cannot be thus explained are some purposive movements, and a few others which have for various reasons become associated with particular emotions. These are all habitual actions, however, and add but little to the sum of organic sensation. It is evident, therefore, that the physical excitement which is mechanically determined is the all-important factor for those who maintain that emotion is organic sensation.² Indeed, it is practically the source of the whole mass of organic sensation into which emotion is analyzed; and this has important consequences, as we shall proceed to show.

In the first place, this organic perturbation is due entirely to the accidental circumstance that more energy has been liberated than can be usefully employed. One obvious result is that, if emotion is the sense of this disturbance, it is a purely accidental

¹ *Expression of the Emotions*, pp. 29, 66.

² Cf. James, *Principles of Psychology*, ii, p. 465.

and unmeaning phenomenon. Professor Dewey is aware of the danger here, and refuses to admit, with James,¹ that a large number of organic changes may be simply "mechanical outpourings through the easiest drainage channels." He finds it "more or less intolerable" that the bodily attitude should be wholly accidental. Our emotions are "too relevant and important in our lives to be in the main the 'feel' of bodily attitudes that have themselves no meaning."² He accordingly asserts that the 'easiest path' is determined by habits which upon the whole were evolved as useful. He means by this, apparently, that 'emotional expression' is constituted by actions which were once useful and by discharges which are "disturbances, defects, and alienations of adjusted movements."³ The greater part of the bodily changes will certainly come under the latter head, and emotion can scarcely be any more "relevant or important" if it is mainly the 'feel' of organic changes which represent disturbances, defects, and alienations of teleological adjustments. Those who identify emotion with organic sensation, therefore, must regard it as a chance-determined and purposeless ebullition which has no legitimate place in our psychical nature. They can look forward to the time when things will be so arranged that no more nerve force is liberated than is necessary for action. In that happy era men will no longer love their friends or hate their enemies, and will attach but a dim historical significance to such words as 'fear,' 'admiration,' and 'contempt.' Or, at all events, when the 'organic thrill' has disappeared and organic sensation is meted out on strictly economic principles, emotions must become so pale and cold that they scarcely deserve the name.

Another result may be deduced from the fact that nearly all the physical changes that accompany emotion are caused by the spread of excess energy through the body. Since the process is under mechanical law, a given amount of energy spreading through a given organism will produce certain effects, whatever be the nature of the situation which is instrumental

¹ Cf. James, *Principles of Psychology*, ii, p. 482.

² *Psych. Rev.*, 1894, p. 563.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 561, 569.

in liberating this force. There is simply so much energy which is under a mechanical necessity to find an outlet. That the special nature of the occasion has no influence in determining the actual channels of discharge becomes still more obvious when we remember that the whole process is necessary just because there is an excess of energy over and above what is required for action appropriate to the special circumstances. The bodily changes depend entirely upon the constitution of the particular organism and the amount of stimulus. As the organism is never in the same condition, and as the situation in which a particular emotion arises does not always possess the same stimulating power, we find that the same emotion may have different expressions at different times, and different emotions may have fundamentally the same expression. No one denies the first part of this contention,¹ and the second can be substantiated. Trembling, changes in the blood supply, respiratory disturbances, palpitation of the heart, glandular affections, are characteristic of all emotions which are equally violent.² A few habitual actions alone are peculiar to particular emotions, and these would form but a slight ground of distinction between one emotion and another. We may conclude, therefore, that emotion cannot be the sum of the organic sensations aroused by the bodily disturbance, since this view does not seem to harmonize with introspective results, or with what we know about emotion and the origin of the organic excitement.

In discussing the first contention we have incidentally criticised the second at the same time. While the general physical condition of the individual undoubtedly affects his emotional life, the physical changes accompanying emotion cannot act as causes, since they may be practically identical in the case of different emotions and widely different in different instances of the same emotion. Even if they remained relatively constant in each case, a further objection could be made. Everything depends, ultimately at least, on the way in which we view

¹ Cf. Lange, *Ueber Gemüthsbewegungen*, pp. 74-75.

² Lange finds the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between the 'expression' of anger and joy (pp. 28 ff.). He finally asserts a distinction which Wundt rightly maintains does not always exist (*Phil. Stud.*, vi, p. 351).

the situation.¹ If this be true, on the James theory we must say that the intellectual condition determines the bodily changes, and these in turn cause the emotion. But this seems a purely gratuitous duplication of conditions. The perception of danger, for instance, is a good and sufficient reason for being afraid, and it appears altogether unnecessary to assume the second condition, which adds nothing and does not make the origin of the emotion any more intelligible. The organic duplicate does not even throw any light on the question of the physical basis of emotion. It is itself a psychical condition, for, unless the theory implies that the *sensation* of physical change is the cause of emotion, the phenomena of anaesthesia, on which so much stress is laid, are totally irrelevant.

Professor Dewey denies that the intellectual condition plays any part at all. "The [physical] reaction is not made on the basis of the apprehension of some quality in the object. It is made on the basis of an organized habit."² We instinctively run away; lungs, heart, vaso-motor system, etc., are excited; and we have the idea of the object as dangerous, or the emotion of fear. "The mode of behavior is the primary thing, and the idea and the emotional excitation are constituted at one and the same time."³ But Professor Dewey also tells us that emotion is the adjustment or tension of habit and ideal.⁴ "The emotional stress of feeling emerges when formed habits conflict with the line of action demanded by a changed situation."⁵ On the first view, emotion is constituted by instinctive actions; on the second, it arises only when instincts do not meet the exigencies of the case, when, instead of action, there is an "effort of adjustment." If we overlook the discrepancy between the two positions, and examine the first, certain difficulties suggest themselves. Under the circumstances it is not obvious why the sense of danger should arise at all, or in what sense emotions can be "relevant and important in our lives." The modes of behavior cannot be simply assumed, and it is not

¹ Cf. James, *Psych. Rev.*, 1894, p. 518.

² *Psych. Rev.*, 1895, p. 20.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵ *PHIL. REV.*, 1896, p. 298.

easy, on this view, to explain the origin of some of them — the 'instinctive activity' peculiar to pity, for instance. Sometimes a number of modes of behavior are possible in a given situation, and, since intellect counts for so little, it is difficult to understand why one instinctive tendency is evoked and not another. Frequently the actions connected with emotion are not instinctive at all, and sometimes emotion remains when all action, instinctive or voluntary, is inhibited. Until these difficulties are overcome, we must continue to believe that the intellectual condition which we have postulated is the real cause.

It is obvious that by bringing our results together we can dismiss the third contention briefly. Pleasure-pain and organic sensation are mere concomitants of emotion. It is not necessary to assume their presence in order to account for the origin of emotion, and their variations do not affect the essential character of the latter. Hence we cannot assert with Baldwin,¹ Ribot² and others that emotion can be analyzed into these two elements. Külpe's statement of this theory, however, may be briefly mentioned. He defines emotion as "a fusion of feelings and organic sensations."³ "Fusion occurs when the connecting qualities are thrust more or less into the background by the total impression which results from the connection."⁴ This implies that 'fusion' must not be taken as a kind of chemical process, and Külpe further insists that it must always be possible, by direct or indirect means, to analyze the total impression into its component elements.⁵ There is undoubtedly a process of the kind here described, but emotion cannot be a 'fusion' of the elements indicated. It evidently cannot be analyzed into pleasure-pain and organic sensation, for these, as we have seen, are mere concomitants. Indeed, it does not seem possible to account for emotion as a fusion or blending of any elements whatever. We cannot directly analyze feeling-attitude

¹ *Psych. Rev.*, 1894, pp. 610 ff.

² *Psychologie des sentiments*, pp. 12, 433.

³ *Psychologie*, pp. 331, 333; Titchener's *Trans.*, pp. 320, 322.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22; *Trans.*, p. 21. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 285; *Trans.*, p. 277.

into anything else, and all the indirect evidence corroborates the introspective result. Emotion has special conditions and a special effect on action; it is a reaction, and consequently a unity. Hence it cannot be a blending of non-emotional elements; it is not only unanalyzable, but also irreducible.

Mr. Marshall's theory has a certain affinity with the general standpoint of James and Lange, and may, for convenience, be treated at this stage. This writer holds that there are mental states corresponding to every instinctive activity.¹ These 'instinct feelings,' apparently, are independent of the general organic disturbance. They constitute the states we call emotions when they are the correlates of immediate instinctive activities which involve a definitely fixed and invariable series of motor elements.² This view cannot be regarded as altogether free from difficulties. Mr. Marshall is forced to maintain that the reactions which emotions accompany are fixed and definite, for on any other supposition the fixity and definiteness of the particular emotions could not be explained. But it is clear that the reactions with which emotions are 'correlated' are not always of this description. Hate, for instance, may be correlated with entirely different actions at different times, since one scheme of vengeance does not fit all cases. It would thus be impossible to point out any fixed reaction which this feeling always 'accompanies.' This implies that the actions need not be instinctive at all. Sometimes they are, particularly in the case of anger and fear; but in many other emotions it is evident from the nature of things that instinctive action is usually ruled out. Nor can it be maintained that emotion is, at all events, invariably the correlate of a general instinct — revenge, for example. Such an 'instinct,' manifesting itself in diverse forms, could not be composed of the fixed elements which Mr. Marshall finds it necessary to postulate. A general instinct, moreover, is really not an 'instinct' in the strict meaning of the word. It is really a frame of mind in which certain courses of action appeal to us with unusual force, and is thus a phenomenon which must be connected with emotion itself. This leads

¹ *Mind*, 1895, p. 180.

² *Ibid.*, p. 183.

up to the fundamental objection that emotion is a very potent factor in conduct, and cannot be regarded as a mere concomitant of instinctive activity. Many of the 'instincts' which Mr. Marshall assumes will be found to presuppose the influence of emotion. That the latter is a condition, and not a mere concomitant of action, becomes more evident when we observe that even when the appropriate activity is inhibited the emotion still remains. Pity and hate, for instance, are frequently present where there is no activity with which they could be 'correlated.' This is intelligible if these states are conditions of action, but somewhat difficult to understand if they are the mere accompaniments of particular activities. We may note, in conclusion, the objection urged by Professor Baldwin that on this theory vivid consciousness is associated with habitual actions.¹ Mr. Marshall, in replying to this, asserts that emotions are in their very nature dependent on irregularity of recurrence and forcibleness of reaction, and are thus exceptions to the general rule that habit implies diminution of consciousness.² But whether the emotional reaction be forcible or not, depends on circumstances. Dislike and anxiety are not necessarily accompanied by intense activity, and in the case of an inert individual a large amount of pity may coexist with a very small amount of exertion. In regard to the other point, we may say that, once the cues on which habit depends are fixed, it does not seem to make much difference whether the activity be of regular or irregular occurrence.

4. The Herbartians seem to identify emotion with mere disturbance and excitement,³ and writers of all shades of opinion tend to adopt the same position. Thus Professor James tells us that he "took for granted, without discussion, that the word 'emotion' meant the rank feeling of excitement, and that the special emotions were names of special feelings of excitement, and not of mild feelings that might remain when the excitement was removed."⁴ It is important, therefore, to determine whether

¹ *Psych. Rev.*, 1894, p. 619.

² *Mind*, 1895, pp. 184-5.

³ Waitz, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, pp. 478-9; Nahlowsky, *Das Gefühlsleben*, pp. 244 ff.; Volkmann, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, ii, p. 389.

⁴ *Psych. Rev.*, 1894, p. 525.

excitement is an essential attribute of emotion. This question is not a mere verbal one, for it does not concern the arbitrary imposition of a name. The term 'emotion' has already been applied to certain mental states, and it is a question of fact to determine whether these consist essentially of commotion or excitement.

Excitement appears whenever the mental equipoise is seriously disturbed. In such circumstances voluntary attention becomes difficult or impossible, the ideational train is affected, and ill-directed or random movements take the place of coördinated activities. The ordered whole no longer exists, and the parts assert their independence. In a sense, there is excitement when the stimulus is strong enough to heighten general activity without bringing discoordination in its train. No one, however, would identify emotion with excitement of this sort, and we shall, therefore, adopt the narrower definition of the term. Any excessive stimulus, especially if sudden, tends to destroy the mental equilibrium, and, in a greater or less degree, to reduce the psychical system to its component parts. Mental excitement is thus conditioned in much the same way as the organic perturbation which constitutes so large a part of 'emotional expression.' It must be noted, however, that, although the stimulating power of the situation affects mind and body at the same time, the amount of commotion is not always the same in both cases. The physical disturbance is practically uncontrollable, while the psychical excitement can to a certain extent be repressed, and at times may be totally inhibited. Hence the former may be strong while the latter is weak.

We can understand, therefore, why excitement should accompany great fear, sudden anger, and intense joy. It is obvious, however, that it is not a necessary concomitant of emotion in general. Fear may act simply as a healthy stimulus to the normal activities which the circumstances evoke. Hate may be very intense, while the general mental condition is free from excitement. This species of hate may be the most deadly, for the absence of commotion renders possible the highest concentration of which the feeling is capable. A person can be

apparently 'cold-blooded,' and yet have the strongest emotions. Certain emotions, moreover, are, from the nature of the case, habitually dissociated from all excitement. Contempt, for instance, implies that a certain individual may be entirely disregarded; hence, when it is free from all admixture with anger, it may be strong and yet coexist with absolute mental serenity. Further, when excitement reaches a certain pitch it tends to weaken the emotion, and when it gets beyond all bounds emotion tends to disappear. In such cases there is much *commotion*, but little or no emotion. Rage may thus pass into sheer psychological turmoil, and in extreme terror there would be much more real fear if coherent intellectual activity were possible. Finally, it is to be observed that emotion is not the only state which is accompanied by excitement. Pure pleasure-pain, when excessive, has this concomitant also.

Excitement is thus a merely accidental concomitant of the states we call emotions. It depends mainly on the relation between strength of stimulus and the stimulus-capacity of the individual. If we regard it as an essential attribute, and use it as a criterion, we must make the most arbitrary distinctions. We must separate the stronger and the weaker forms of the same emotion, and distinguish between strong feelings accompanied by commotion and the same feelings equally strong but calm and concentrated. We must assert that hate, affection, and admiration are only occasionally emotions, though they have at all times the same conditions and effects, and manifest the same character.

The belief that excitement is an essential element in emotion is responsible for many misconceptions of the nature of this aspect of mind. The James-Lange theory loses much of its plausibility when we recognize that many mild feelings have the essential attribute of emotion, and that an emotion may be strong without involving violent agitation. The prejudice that all emotions are strong and that strength and violence are the same thing, also accounts for the fact that the function of emotion is commonly overlooked, for excitement of course is simply disturbance of coördinated activity. It is evident, too, that it

is scarcely possible to detect the true emotional *quale* when attention is directed exclusively to states of excitement. In these states emotion is hidden by the crowd of concomitants, and, in any case, the commotion renders introspection almost impossible.

5. One can easily understand the origin of the common opinion that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain and cognition. As emotion is a subjective state, it is naturally confused with pleasure-pain, especially when the ambiguous term 'feeling' is used; and when it is observed that the former has an objective reference which the latter lacks, the cognitive element is added to account for this fact. The objective reference is regarded as belonging to the presentative factor.¹ The theory appears with many variations, but we shall consider it mainly in its general form.

This position must imply either that the mere co-presence of the elements is all that is necessary, or that some process of blending or fusion comes into play. But the mere coexistence of pleasure-pain and cognition is not emotion. Pleasure-pain has no outward reference at all, and the objective reference of cognition is different from that of emotion. A cognitive state refers beyond itself in the sense that it reports the nature and existence of something; emotion, on the other hand, has the outward reference which is characteristic of attention and reaction in general. In emotion, therefore, there is something which the mere co-presence of cognition and pleasure-pain cannot explain. And if some process of blending or fusion be invoked, the case is not altered. As chemical fusion cannot be implied, it must be possible to distinguish the constituents in the total impression. This cannot be done, and all that we know about the conditions and effects of the alleged result goes to prove that it is not only unanalyzable but also irreducible. Emotion cannot be reduced to the elements mentioned any more than attention can be analyzed into pleasure-pain and the object attended to. There is also reason to believe that pleasure-pain is in this case a pure concomitant, and cannot

¹ Sully, *Human Mind*, i, p. 65, note.

therefore be a constituent. The other element cannot explain objective reference if it blends with anything else to form the emotion. If the object thus disappears in the total impression, the latter cannot be a feeling towards the object. Objective reference is essential, and for that reason the cognition of the object must not blend. Hence, even if pleasure-pain could act as a constituent, the presentative element, so far as it is idea or perception of object, could not be the other factor.

On this theory the differences between the various emotions are no less inexplicable than the general characteristic of emotion as such. Professor Sully maintains that "each of the well-marked species of emotion has its characteristic group of [physical] reactions. . . . Thus, as already hinted, fear is differentiated from other emotive states in general, as well as from other varieties of disagreeable feeling, by its peculiar organic resonance, including such familiar effects as that disturbance of the heart's action known as palpitation, tremor of muscles, pallor, certain alterations in the secretions."¹ This implies that emotions derive their specific character from the organic sensations which accompany them. We have seen, however, that the bodily changes mentioned by Sully are not peculiar to fear, and that no emotion is accompanied by a characteristic organic resonance. The physical changes which are definitely associated with particular emotions are habitual actions which give rise to little organic sensation. Moreover, no appreciable organic perturbation is observable in the case of the weaker emotional states. It is evident, therefore, that the facts cannot be explained in this way.

Lehmann seeks another solution of the difficulty. He asserts that bodily pain, fear, anger, hate, etc., are all painful feelings, and the differences between them arise solely from the fact that the pain is in each case bound up with different ideas. Similarly, the distinctions which exist between the pleasurable feelings — hope, aesthetic enjoyment, joy, love, etc. — are due to the differences in the ideas with which the hedonic effect is

¹ *Human Mind*, ii, p. 67.

connected.¹ The obvious objection here is that, as the same emotion may arise under very different circumstances, very different ideas are supposed to arouse in us essentially the same feelings. Lehmann notices this difficulty, but bids us observe (1) that the circumstances always have an essentially similar character, (2) that the feeling has in each case a peculiar stamp in consequence of these variations.² The second remark is not true if it is applied to emotion as such apart from its concomitants in the concrete state. The first statement, on the other hand, is undeniably correct. The circumstances in which we are injured, the ideas associatively aroused, etc., may affect the intensity of the emotion, but not its specific quality. The fact that we are injured is the essential thing. But if this is the case, it is obviously inaccurate to say that the special emotions gain their specific character from the ideas with which they are bound up. It is the general nature of the situation or object which is effective, not the ideas in their particularity. More accurately, the all-important factor is the *recognition* of the nature of the situation or object, for unless we are aware of danger, injury, etc., the corresponding emotions do not appear. The mere brute presence of certain facts does not affect the emotional life, and, on the other hand, our view of the circumstances is equally effective whether it be true or not. Hence the logical conclusion from Lehmann's statement is that a particular emotion arises when we regard the situation or object in a certain way. It is certain, therefore, that a cognitive element does give character to the special emotions; but it is evidently a *condition*, and not a constituent. When we perceive danger,

¹ *Die Haupt. des Gef.*, pp. 17-18. This implies that the various emotions are distinguished from one another and from pleasure-pain by means of the percepts and ideas with which they are connected. But, later on, the author tells us that not only are organic sensations with their accompanying feeling-tone integral parts of emotion, but they may by themselves constitute emotion (*Die Haupt. des Gef.*, p. 118). It may be urged that these two positions are not really inconsistent, that the author is dealing with the feelings (*Gefühle*) of hate, love, etc., in the one instance, and with the corresponding emotions (*Affekte*) in the other. This distinction can only mean that excitement is absent in the one case and present in the other, and we have seen that it is not legitimate to use excitement as a basis of distinction.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

fear arises; and nothing else is necessary to account for the origin of the emotion. This would not be the case if the perception in question were merely one element of fear among others. On the latter supposition, of course, fear could only be present when the other constituent or constituents were in existence. Hence we cannot account for the specific nature of the particular emotions unless we assume that the intellectual element conditions the appearance of something different from pleasure-pain and from any combination of the latter with cognition. Thus the result of the whole discussion is that, whether we consider the specific qualities of the different emotions or the emotional *quale* as such, we must come to the conclusion that emotion is not a combination of pleasure-pain and cognition.

In addition to the foregoing criticism it seems necessary to discuss in some detail the special form of this theory which is adopted by Professor Sully and others. Sully defines emotion as "a mass or aggregate of sensuous and representative material having a strongly marked and predominant concomitant of feeling or affective tone."¹ This seems to be in the main the position of Professor Bain and Mr. Spencer, and probably represents a common opinion. We have already pointed out the difficulties involved in the conception of emotion as a combination of pleasure-pain and cognition, and we shall confine ourselves here as much as possible to a criticism of the contention that emotion is a 'mass.'

In the first place, as we have already shown, no cognitive mass is necessary. The simple conception 'injury' is all that is indispensable for the appearance of anger, and the other emotions are dependent on other conceptions equally non-massive. Moreover, emotion in proportion to its strength fixes attention on one object and on one class of motor ideas. The individual who is thoroughly afraid can think only of the danger and the means of escape, and in intense fear the idea of the fearful object may dominate consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. Hate and affection, when they are living

¹ *Human Mind*, ii, p. 57.

realities and not mere potentialities, contract the circle of consciousness in a similar way. When we are brooding over an injury our minds may be filled with a multitude of ideas, but in these circumstances anger is weak or merely potential, and when it becomes real and strong the crowd of ideas is summarily dispersed. Emotion, in short, is not in its origin dependent on a mass of ideas and sensations, and while it exists it is hostile to this mass in proportion to its intensity.

In the second place, no feeling of pleasure or pain is necessary, since the intellectual condition is alone essential. Sometimes, as a matter of fact, emotion succeeds cognition before the hedonic element can make itself felt, and in many cases the pleasure-pain is so weak that its presence is rather inferred than felt. One may have strong contempt for a worthless person merely because he is worthless. Probably there is a sort of aesthetic pain in these circumstances, but it is not a conscious factor of any importance if the emotion is strong. And if all the pleasures and pains which might possibly be aroused did make themselves felt, they would conflict, and thus to some extent neutralize one another. The causes of hate are *per se* painful, but the sthenic effect and the thought of vengeance are pleasurable. Emotion cannot be compared in this respect with those states in which everything seems gloomy or cheerful according to the dominant mood. In such cases only ideas that involve a particular hedonic character tend to arise, and sensations and perceptions which are accompanied by the opposite hedonic effect are thrust out of consciousness by force of attention, or viewed in such a way that the feeling-tone is minimized or altered. When we are melancholy our minds are filled with dismal thoughts, and the joys and pleasures of the world seem 'hollow' and 'unreal.' On the other hand, in a joyous mood we see the best side of everything, and slur over the rest. It cannot be said that this happens in the case of emotion. That an individual is smarting under a series of injuries does not diminish the satisfaction and pleasure he experiences in planning schemes of revenge, or render him less ready to entertain such thoughts. And, as we have

pointed out, there need be no dominant feeling at all. The hedonic elements may be weak and comparatively unimportant; hence a mood could not be established, since its first condition is lacking.

Even if this mass of hedonic and cognitive material did in all instances exist, difficulties would still present themselves. Each emotion has a definite quality, and this is inexplicable on the assumption that it is a heterogeneous mass of pleasures, pains, ideas, sensations, percepts. Moreover, the mass is not a fixed quantity in each case. The ideas and perceptions differ with circumstances, and the organic sensations and feelings of pleasure and pain are equally variable. The advocates of the 'mass' theory ought to explain how it comes about that we apply the name 'hate' to a large quantity of pain, a small amount of pleasure and one set of ideas and sensations, while we also use the term to designate a large amount of pleasure, a small amount of pain, and another set of ideas and sensations. If they assert that amid the diversity there is unity, they are unquestionably right; but they will find that if feeling-attitude be left out the unity in no sense forms a mass. The elements of cognition and pleasure-pain which are common to all cases of hate are very few indeed. If it be maintained that the hate differs with the diversity of the alleged constituents, it must be urged that if this were true the diversity would swamp the unity, and there would be very little justification for the application of the common name in the different cases.

The view under discussion derives some plausibility from the fact that emotions, when strong, are felt to possess a characteristic which might be termed 'massiveness.' They are never local, isolated, or partial activities; they are the reactions of the individual as such, ways in which he is disposed towards something. Hence, when they are prominent in consciousness, they are felt as diffused. This massiveness, however, is not the result of addition; it follows from the fact that emotions are 'total' states, reactions of the individual as a whole.

Wundt's theory is hard to classify, but it may for convenience be treated here. At this stage it can be briefly discussed.

According to this writer, emotion is a complex state consisting of a primary feeling of pleasure or pain which causes an inhibition or stimulation of ideational activity, and is in turn modified by the feelings thus originated. Emotion is thus partly the immediate effect of the primary feeling on ideational activity, and partly the effect of this change on the original feeling.¹ It is not merely a strong pleasure or pain, nor a feeling or succession of feelings caused by the ideational change; it is a complex state composed of the hedonic and ideational elements.² Towards the close of his exposition, however, Wundt makes an elaborate attempt to prove that certain impulses are the earliest forms of emotion.³ This is rather significant, for if his original description were correct, there would be little temptation to identify emotion with impulse.

The first set of statements really gives an account of the circumstances which occasionally precede the appearance of emotion. Sometimes there is a sudden shock which inhibits all ideational activity; sometimes anger, hate, etc., do not arise until we brood over the event. It cannot be maintained, however, that emotion is always ushered in by a shock. The latter is in any case altogether irrelevant, for it may precede any emotion indifferently. It is evident, also, that no crowd of ideas is necessary. These alleged constituents, therefore, are not even invariable antecedents. We have also pointed out that the primary feeling is not essential. As a matter of fact, it may be so weak that it is barely perceptible, and in such cases the intensity of the emotion is out of all proportion to the intensity of the pleasure-pain. The secondary feelings cannot always be relied upon to strengthen the primary, for they may conflict with it, and thus neutralize it. It is to be noted, also, that there is nothing in common between a complex of elements loosely conjoined and the unitary character which every emotion, as reaction, possesses.

In reviewing the theories we have been criticising, we may

¹ *Phil. Stud.*, vi, p. 360; *Grundzüge der phys. Psy.*, 1887, ii, p. 405.

² *Menschen- und Thierseele* (1892), p. 405; Eng. Trans., p. 372.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 421-2; Eng. Trans., pp. 386-7.

observe that emotion is not usually identified with pure cognition, pleasure-pain, or conation. Most psychologists admit, tacitly at least, that it differs in some respect from the other aspects of mind. We have tried to prove that this difference cannot be regarded as the result of a union of non-emotional elements. Pleasure-pain, organic sensations, ideas, and percepts vary without affecting the essential nature of the emotion they accompany. A cognitive element must be present ; but, as it is the only indispensable factor, it must be a condition, and not a constituent. The ambiguity of the word 'emotion' seems to point to the fact that the true differentiating attribute has not been emphasized and employed as a criterion. When the true connotation of a word is made explicit, the denotation will generally take care of itself.

THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS.

BEFORE we can ascertain the primary emotions we must evidently determine what states are emotional, but the two inquiries go hand in hand and cannot well be separated. In attempting to fix the denotation of the term 'emotion' we shall apply the results already attained, and rule out all phenomena which do not involve feeling in reference to an object. The states which exhibit the emotional characteristic are usually complex, since emotions blend with one another, and are associated more or less intimately with intellectual and hedonic accompaniments. To discover the primary forms we must distinguish the various emotional elements from the concomitants with which they are blended or associated, for it is only by considering the emotions in themselves that we can determine their essential qualitative distinctions. At every point we must depend primarily on introspection, though some aid may be derived from an acquaintance with the conditions and effects of the facts under investigation.

It may be urged that a blending can be so thorough that the component parts are not discernible in the total impression, and that a conscious fact may thus be unanalyzable and yet not ultimate. It is questionable, however, whether we have any right to assert that a blending has taken place if the presence of the different elements cannot be detected. When direct analysis is impossible, the nature of the alleged constituents and the fact of combination itself, are mere matters of conjecture. Moreover, in this particular instance, the phenomena which resist analysis can be shown to have distinctive conditions and results, and are therefore not only unanalyzable but also ultimately irreducible. In any case, it is important to know how far the various emotions can be reduced to primary forms by means of introspection, guided and corroborated by a knowledge of conditions and results. If we do not in this way reach the end of the matter, we at least make the proper beginning,

for it is absurd to take refuge in hypothesis or conjecture until we have ascertained how far direct knowledge can carry us.

For the purposes of exposition, the phenomena which require examination may be arranged under the following heads: (1) joy and grief, (2) anger and fear, (3) ill-feeling and its opposite, (4) feelings of repugnance, (5) admiration and scorn, (6) feelings of self, (7) intellectual, aesthetic, ethical, and religious feelings. The results of our inquiry can at present be merely tentative. Analysis, though always possible, is not always easy, and the number of states which must be dealt with is by no means small. The ambiguity of language is also a source of difficulty. It is scarcely possible, indeed, to emphasize too strongly the misleading character of ordinary terminology.

1. The prominent element in joy is the agreeable sense of advantageous transition. In addition to this, however, there is another factor to which the term 'satisfaction' may be applied. As we shall show later on, satisfaction is a reaction, a feeling in reference to an object. Usually it occupies a subordinate place, but it gains in relative importance when joy is calm and profound. Grief is more distinctively emotional than joy, for its chief feature is the feeling-attitude which may be called 'dissatisfaction.'¹ More specifically, it is unavailing dissatisfaction with a state of affairs which cannot be remedied. Grief is thus distinguished from pure dissatisfaction, not merely by the intensity of its hedonic accompaniment, but also by the feeling of powerlessness, which it necessarily involves. Since it is primarily a reaction, it is distinct from misery as such. The latter is the hedonic state which appears when the unpleasantness attending disadvantageous transition inhibits emotional reaction. Grief must also be differentiated from sorrow and sadness. In sorrow there is little or no dissatisfaction, and the salient feature is regret, *i.e.*, retrospective wish referring to some painful event in the past. Sadness is the diffused but subdued unpleasantness which results when the individual is predisposed to see the dark side of everything. Melancholy is simply

¹ Although 'dissatisfaction' has associations which tend to narrow its meaning, it is the most convenient term available.

sadness in a more permanent form.¹ It may be accompanied by anger, ill-feeling, and other emotions, but it is not itself a peculiar feeling-attitude.²

Since satisfaction and its opposite are present in joy and grief, respectively, it is necessary at this point to discuss them in detail. Dissatisfaction seems to be unquestionably emotional. It cannot be identified with pain as such for several reasons. It has always an outward reference, since it cannot exist without an object to which it is directed. It is never caused by the mere presence of the discordant, but invariably depends upon an intellectual condition, namely, the recognition of the fact that some object is discordant. This explains why it does not always appear when we are pained, and may arise when we are agreeably affected; for the immediate influence of an object and its ultimate effects may widely diverge, and that which is conditioned by cognition is not necessarily determined by the immediately present. Further, dissatisfaction does not prompt to the removal of itself, but gives rise to action affecting an object. In short, it can be proved to be a reaction, and is therefore entirely distinct from pain. On the other hand, it cannot be analyzed into mere intellectual or practical attitude, and we seem forced to conclude that it is a feeling-attitude. In regard to satisfaction the case may seem to be less clear. Nevertheless, all that has been said in reference to dissatisfaction applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to its opposite; and though the latter can only have a negative effect on conduct, still a negative influence implies a positive function, and one that may be very important. Hence, for the present at least, we include satisfaction among the emotions.

It is not difficult to ascertain the modes of behavior which are characteristic of dissatisfaction and its counterpart. The one prompts to action that will produce some desirable change in the discordant; the other inhibits all activity in reference

¹ 'Gentle' or 'pleasing' melancholy is melancholy modified by the presence of a somewhat unaccountable element of pleasure. This state, like melancholy proper, may be accompanied by emotion, but is not itself emotional.

² Gladness and cheerfulness correspond to sadness and melancholy, and do not require special attention.

to its object. It is not so easy to define the conditions of the two emotions with clearness and accuracy. We may say, however, that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are evoked by anything which is regarded simply as harmonious or the reverse. Whenever actual or possible results are explicitly thought of in connection with the object, ill-feeling or its opposite will appear, and the events themselves, if objectionable, will cause anger and fear. Accordingly, satisfaction and dissatisfaction refer most frequently to inanimate things or to a state of affairs, for in these cases the connection between agent and effect is felt to be in a measure external, and the effects themselves when objectionable are not so apt to cause anger or fear.

2. Anger is evidently a feeling in reference to an object. It is not a necessary result of pain or harm, and, on the other hand, it is not caused merely by injustice or injury inflicted by others. It is possible to be pained without being angry, and we may be angry on account of actions of our own, even when these do not involve injustice, but are mere mistakes or blunders. The primary condition of this emotion is the occurrence of something which is felt to be objectionable, and which in consequence is not acquiesced in. Rebellion against something is the characteristic of anger, and this presupposes that something is regarded as objectionable. What the individual objects to, depends upon his special nature and the range of his sympathies. At the present stage of development, anger almost invariably involves the notion that 'this should not happen.' This implies that we now recognize that we ought to acquiesce in everything else.¹

It may be maintained that originally the conditions of anger must have been simpler than those which we have indicated. It seems possible, it may be contended, that anger was the natural response to any pain, actual or threatened, unless the sense of powerlessness was also present, in which case grief or fear would be aroused. We must point out, however, that the

¹ If the term 'injury' is taken in its widest sense, and used to signify anything that should not happen, the statement that anger is dependent on the sense of injury is an accurate account of the facts, as they at present exist.

individual is not angry because he is pained, but because he objects to being pained. If for any reason he acquiesces in pain, no anger follows, and he may be angry on account of receiving pleasure, if, as sometimes happens, he objects to being affected in that way. We cannot imagine an angry emotion which does not imply that something is felt as objectionable. It is true that the condition which anger involves is not always explicitly present, for the emotion may become an habitual response to certain stimuli. It must be remembered, however, that the condition is presupposed in the formation of the habit.

Anger must be sharply distinguished from ill-feeling in general, and therefore from hate. As conscious states the emotions are absolutely distinct, and there is a corresponding divergence in their conditions and in the character of the objects to which they refer. Anger depends solely on the cognition of the fact that something objectionable has occurred or may occur, while ill-feeling presupposes that some individual is regarded as the cause of objectionable effects. In the one case attention need not pass beyond the event; in the other it must be directed to the cause. Hence ill-feeling refers to the agent, while the object of anger is something that happens. You hate the person, you are angry with what he has done. When anger is apparently directed to the conceit, stupidity, shallowness, or any other quality of the individual, it will be found that its object is really the actual or threatened occurrence of results which are directly or indirectly involved in the agent's actual or possible behavior. One who is easily roused to anger is not necessarily prone to ill-feeling or hate; indeed, a 'good heart' and a choleric disposition are frequently associated. Naturally enough, the feeling in reference to the occurrence is often accompanied by the feeling towards the agent, and this constant blending of anger and ill-feeling tends to obscure their qualitative difference. There are certain occasions, however, when anger is separated from this concomitant, and in these cases its true nature comes to light. When, for instance, we are angry at our own mistakes, we are simply angry at what has happened. Again, when the cause of injury is an individual for whom we have a strong affection,

ill-feeling will probably be inhibited. We may be angry at the behavior of a friend without any trace of malevolent feeling towards him. In such cases we have merely a feeling in reference to what has occurred.

This distinction between the conditions and objects of the two emotions enables us to understand other differences which exist between them. Anger is usually less enduring than ill-feeling, for an event is transitory in its very nature, while an agent is relatively permanent. Anger, too, is frequently, though not necessarily, accompanied by excitement, since an event comes into direct relation with us, and must, if possible, be dealt with at once. It is more rarely suppressed than ill-feeling, for an occurrence as such is a single thing which stands out alone, while an agent is the sum of a past and the promise of a future. The event thus frequently causes immediate anger on occasions when ill-feeling is checked by the remembrance of our past relations with the agent. Moreover, although the occurrence may be one that ought not to be ignored, the agent's general nature may nevertheless be such that his other actions outweigh the particular instance. Even where it is not possible to overlook the single event, therefore, it may be both possible and right to ignore its connection with the agent when it is a question of our feeling-attitude towards him.

It is now possible to understand the influence which anger exerts on conduct. The emotion being a feeling in reference to an event which is felt as objectionable, it is natural to suppose that it prompts to self-assertive action which will ward off the injury or prevent its recurrence. This is what we find, if we do not confound anger and ill-feeling. It is obviously inaccurate to say that retaliation is the mode of behavior which always accompanies anger, for we may be angry with what we ourselves have done, and, when others are the offenders, a threat or a warning may be regarded as sufficient. Anger is satisfied when the individual has asserted himself and taken steps to protect himself. As it is not itself ill-feeling towards the agent, it does not imply delight in suffering as such.

So far we have been treating anger *per se*, and we may now

examine several more or less complex states in which this emotion is closely associated with various concomitants. Rage is anger accompanied by excitement. Wrath is anger transfused with the sense of power. Irritation arises when the expression of the emotion is restrained, either by something purely external, or by some internal check which is antagonistic to the mood which prevails. It is thereby differentiated from anger voluntarily repressed, and always involves a sense of restraint. Irritation passes into exasperation when the emotion becomes so strong that the inhibition is overcome. Indignation is not simply moral anger, for it may be evoked when no moral standpoint is adopted. Nor is it merely altruistic anger, since anger is the same whether it be felt on our own account or on behalf of others. As the name partly indicates, indignation is called forth by occurrences which indicate unworthiness on the part of some agent. Accordingly, it contains anger in reference to the event and also scorn of the unworthiness therein evinced, the former being the predominant element.¹ This explains why it is almost invariably 'altruistic,' for scorn rarely applies to the self. Resentment in its more passive form appears when the angry emotion is checked by self-respect, or by the sense of powerlessness. Its salient feature is a feeling of injury, and, though anger is present in an incipient stage at least, the total state is more cognitive and hedonic than emotional.

Fear is the emotion which arises when the individual knows, or suspects, that he cannot cope with some evil which threatens himself or those with whom he is in sympathy. When self-distrust is not present, an impending injury occasions anger instead of fear. A surprisingly unimportant evil will cause fear if we doubt our ability to ward it off, though of course the threatened harm must not be altogether insignificant. This emotion is probably more easily excited than any other. The mere possibility of evil may be sufficient, even when the powerlessness to cope with it is itself a possibility. An unknown or

¹ When scorn is inhibited, a sense of the unworthiness displayed is the sole concomitant of the angry emotion. This state is also called indignation, but it is evidently an abbreviation of the typical form.

unaccountable object tends to inspire fear because it *may* work harm, and we obviously cannot be sure that we are able to defend ourselves. The dread which attaches to the supernatural can be accounted for in this way. The fear of darkness has a more positive basis, for, while the possibility of evil is a mere suggestion of the fancy, the feeling of self-distrust has some justification. It is evident that this bias to fear is due to the experience of the race, which has taught that in doubtful cases it is better to err on the safe side.

Fear, like anger, is a feeling in reference to what happens. When it seems to have an individual for its object, closer observation will discover that it really refers to the effects which the agent may cause. Both anger and fear give rise to self-protective¹ activity, but, while the former disposes the individual to confront an evil and assert himself against it, the latter impels him to protect himself by avoiding what he is not able to resist. When fear is described as a pathological phenomenon, it is evident that the emotion as such is confounded with terror. The latter only appears, however, when the stimulus is too great for the stimulus-capacity of the individual. It is unquestionably pathological, therefore, but it is largely the mere result of excessive stimulus, and only partially an emotion. Normal fear is not accompanied by general discoordination or inhibition, and its influence on conduct can scarcely be disputed. It may be added that slight fears which are barely perceptible may have most important results. The practical efficiency of an emotion depends, not merely on its strength, but also on the absence of opposing forces.

We may now proceed to examine those complex states into which fear enters as one element among others. Dread is a calm and concentrated fear permeated with awe. Consternation is a blending of fear with astonishment or amazement. Anxiety is strain and oscillation of attention, with uneasiness and intermittent fear. It appears when the chances for and against some event of importance cannot be determined with certainty. Attention passes continually from the one alternative

¹ 'Self' must here be taken to cover all that the individual is interested in.

to the other, though the adverse chances always occupy a prominent place. Apprehension is a species of tentative fear. It implies that, while the adverse alternative seems probable, the remaining element of uncertainty prevents the emotion from gaining a firm footing. Alarm is surprise followed by fear, or anxiety, or both. Misgiving is sudden self-distrust, usually attended by some degree of fear.

Hope is defined by Descartes as "a disposition of the soul to persuade itself that the thing which it desires will come to pass."¹ Sometimes this is all that the word signifies, but there is also a definite mental state to which the name is frequently attached. This may be described as a condition of expectancy, but not of direct expectation, in which we await some issue with the pleasurable yet uneasy consciousness that the wished-for result is a possibility. The desired event is not regarded as certain, but the possibility that it may happen is uppermost in the mind. The favorable alternative usually gains this predominance, apart from all calculation of chances or effort of attention, on account of the natural unwillingness to face the possibility of evil. Still, the fact that the desirable result is not assured, is necessarily recognized, and hope thus involves an element of uncertainty and a tendency to alternate with sadness or fear. Hope is, therefore, not a peculiar feeling in reference to an object; in itself it is simply expectancy together with uncertain pleasure.

The so-called 'fear' which is the correlative of hope is totally different from real fear; it is a state of expectancy, in which we look forward to the future with the unpleasing consciousness that some undesirable event is possible. Hope alternates with genuine fear, however, more frequently than with its counterpart, and this is inevitable in the nature of things. A possible evil arouses some emotion which prompts to action which will protect the individual from it, and, since hope refers to some doubtful issue beyond our power, when the evil possibility is prominent we have at once the conditions of fear, namely, threatened evil and sense of powerlessness. But hope

¹ *Œuvres*, Cousin's ed., iv, p. 177.

and fear do not correspond, although the former frequently gives place to the latter. They do not belong to the same order of mental facts, as the preceding analysis has made manifest.

Disappointment appears when an event happens which is contrary to our hopes or wishes. In addition to the hedonic factor, there is present a vivid sense of the conflict between the wished-for and the actual, and also a feeling of discord due to the lack of coördination between the individual and the real. Despair is conditioned by the conviction that some evil is unavoidable, and is constituted by the hedonic effect and the practical attitude which are thereby occasioned. The behavior which is most characteristic of despair is passive expectancy without acquiescence or submission, for this is the immediate effect of the extinction of hope. It may give place, however, either to resignation, or to a reckless activity, which implies as little hope of result as fear of consequences.

3. In hate, ill-feeling, and dislike there is a feeling towards the agent which, for want of a more convenient general term, may be called 'ill-feeling.' The necessary conditions of this emotion are present whenever the object is regarded as the source of effects which are felt as objectionable. The effects in question may be actual or possible, directly or indirectly due to the agent, and may affect ourselves or those in whom we are interested. What the individual objects to, depends on his nature and on circumstances. A person may be disliked on account of his virtues or for the benefits he confers. Ill-feeling, therefore, is not always due to injury or harm; the object need not be malignant or harmful, but simply the source of objectionable results. It must be noted, however, that ill-feeling, like any other reaction, does not always appear when its conditions are present. It may be inhibited on specific occasions by the presence of other emotions, or by the influence which considerations of prudence or justice gradually acquire. As development progresses, the range of the emotion becomes more and more restricted. Thus ill-feeling comes to be regarded as uncalled for, if the objectionable occurrence does not presuppose intention on the

part of the cause. It is felt in these circumstances that the connection between the agent and the effect may be ignored, since the relation is in a sense accidental and does not imply active hostility. It is partly for this reason that ill-feeling towards inanimate things tends to disappear.

Both ill-feeling and anger may be described as self-assertive emotions. The difference in the modes of behavior which are characteristic of each, corresponds to the distinction between their conditions and objects. While anger prompts to self-assertion against some event, ill-feeling leads to self-assertion against some other individual. The value of this duality in self-assertive emotion is obvious. It is not always sufficient to deal with the event; as a rule, it is advantageous to turn to the agent. Hence it is important that there should be, in addition to the feeling in reference to the event, a direct feeling towards the agent, guiding our conduct in regard to it. Ill-feeling, therefore, is not in itself an anomalous or pathological phenomenon. Though it leads to 'malevolent' activity, it may be justifiable, and it undoubtedly has a useful and important function in the life of the individual and of the race.

We may now indicate the distinctions between dislike, ill-feeling as ordinarily understood, and hate; and also analyze the more complex states known as 'envy' and 'jealousy.' Dislike¹ is the mild emotion which is called forth when the actual or possible events associated with the object are not of vital importance. Sometimes it appears when the agent suggests objectionable potentialities in a vague and indefinite way. As the emotional element is weak, the hedonic accompaniment is relatively strong, and the term 'dislike' has come to denote the complex state rather than the feeling-attitude as such. We speak, it is true, of 'intense dislike,' but the fact thus indicated is indistinguishable from what we usually call 'ill-feeling.' The latter is more intense than dislike, and is evoked when the results ascribed to the agent are of considerable importance. Hate is ill-feeling in its most concentrated and

¹ At times 'dislike' seems to mean mild repugnance, but usually it signifies ill-feeling.

permanent form. Though it may be aroused on insufficient provocation, it really presupposes that the object is regarded as essentially and continuously hostile or noxious. This explains why the intensity and the permanence of hate are really independent of the amount of injury actually received.

The word 'envy' sometimes signifies the mere desire or wish to raise ourselves to the level of another who has made us aware of our relative inferiority. Occasionally the term implies irritation on account of the superiority of some one, together with an unpleasant though unavowed sense of inferiority. Usually, however, 'envy' designates a more sinister state, which contains the pain of inferiority, irritation, and a large amount of ill-feeling towards the individual who affects us disagreeably by the mere fact of his superiority. In such circumstances there is no desire or wish directed primarily to the attainment of the envied good. The prominent factors in the total state are ill-feeling and pain, and consequently the objects most strongly desired are the injury of the objectionable individual and the removal of the pain. Both ends, however, may be attained at once, for the individual is injured if the good in question is destroyed, its existence denied, or its value lessened in the eyes of others. Hence the pain and the emotion usually combine their forces, as it were, and produce one strong desire. 'Jealousy' is another ambiguous term. It usually denotes a complex state which includes (1) fear that the desire to attain or retain some highly valued good will be thwarted, (2) ill-feeling towards the agent concerned, (3) intermittent irritation. Sometimes the word is used to indicate a permanent condition of excessive and irritable watchfulness in regard to our own interests. Jealousy in all its forms is differentiated from envy by the absence of the consciousness of inferiority.

Liking, good-feeling, gratitude, pity, and affection involve the emotion of kindly feeling towards an object. We are kindly disposed towards any agent that we regard as actually or potentially beneficial to ourselves or to those with whom we sympathize. But the emotion may also be spontaneous, and may thus be directed towards an object without any reference

to its specific nature. This is evident in the case of those who have inherited or acquired a kindly disposition. Such persons 'overflow' with kindness and are delighted to find an opportunity of exercising it. This implies that the emotional reaction has become so ingrained in the nature of the individual that a need is felt of reacting in that way. While the opposite disposition is possible, it rarely develops, and can never thrive to the same extent. The reasons for this are obvious. Ill-feeling, though useful and necessary on certain occasions, is manifestly detrimental to the individual if it is habitual and spontaneous. It is a species of surgical remedy, and is misplaced and injurious unless there is a special call for it. On the other hand, the kindly temperament is usually advantageous to its possessor, since kindness begets kindness, or at all events tends to disarm hostility. Further, though ill-feeling may at times be distinctly pleasurable, it presupposes discord, and is thus on the whole attended with unpleasantness. Kindly feeling, on the contrary, implies harmony, and is in consequence primarily pleasurable. This is so true that good nature and selfishness may be associated, the former being a part of the latter. Indeed, the forces which work against ill-feeling and in favor of its opposite are so strong that the kindly disposition is not merely an occasional individual temperament, but, in a modified form, has come to be a race characteristic. As a general rule, we feel kindly disposed towards our fellow beings until by their actions they declare themselves to be hostile or noxious. It is possible, of course, that an individual may temporarily or even permanently adopt the other attitude, and it is evident that one who is wrapped up in self will rarely manifest this spontaneous good-feeling, but the limitations and exceptions which must be made do not invalidate the general rule. Indeed, the truth of the latter must be assumed to account for the existence of many facts that would otherwise be wholly unintelligible. No human being is an atom so impenetrable that he is incapable of compassion for those who are in distress. Even the most selfish mortal may be pained by a great calamity which affects others, and roused to indignation on account of

injustice that does not in the remotest degree concern himself. But the good or ill which befalls others gives rise to sympathetic pleasure, pain, or emotion, only if we feel kindly disposed towards them, for kindly feeling expands the self and in proportion to its intensity makes us identify our interests with those of others. Similarly, pity is inexplicable unless we assume a general attitude of good-will. In no other way is it possible to understand why mere need or distress should call forth a special degree of kindly feeling.

The actions and tendencies which are conditioned by this emotion must be carefully distinguished from those which spring from the pleasure which so frequently accompanies it. The desire for intercourse with the object which is involved in liking and affection, is due to the fact that the presence of the object is a source of pleasure. The emotion as such prompts to activity on behalf of the individual who inspires it. Even if it is too weak to produce any positive result, it yet has a negative influence which works to the advantage of the object.

The different instances of this emotion may now be briefly discussed. Liking is a moderate degree of kindly feeling associated with pleasure. As a conscious fact it is distinguished from spontaneous good-feeling by the relative strength of its hedonic concomitant. Gratitude is the kindly feeling towards one who has of his own accord done something for the individual's advantage which could not be demanded as a right. The consciousness of the fact that disinterested kindness has been offered unites with the emotional element to give character to the total state, and at times there is in addition a feeling which partakes of the nature of humility. Pity may be analyzed into sympathetic sorrow or sadness and kindly feeling towards the individual in distress.¹ The relative prominence of the two factors varies with circumstances. Affection is the counterpart of hate. The brevity of our discussion prevents us from enumerating in detail the special circumstances under which affection may originate, but some of them have already been indicated. It is necessary to state, however, that specific

¹ Cf. Descartes, *Œuvres*, Cousin's ed., iv, p. 191.

differences in conditions do not alter the emotional element as such, though they affect the character of the concomitants with which the emotion is at different times associated.

4. Disgust, aversion, abhorrence, detestation, horror, are all emotions of repugnance. They are feelings in reference to some object which is regarded as repulsive, and give rise to actions of withdrawal or avoidance. The object is not an event, but an agent considered merely as repulsive, and not as a source of events affecting ourselves. The events which are due to the object, *quâ* repulsive, tend to cause anger or fear, and when we think of the agent as the cause of such events, ill-feeling tends to appear. The latter statement must be supplemented by the remark that this tendency will not be realized if the repugnance is strong, for ill-feeling and repugnance are in a measure antagonistic. This only means, however, that when the repulsive agent as such is cognized as the source of events affecting ourselves, the repugnance may be so strong that it inhibits the ill-feeling which would otherwise exist. The relation between ill-feeling and repugnance is somewhat similar to that which exists between anger and fear. Both anger and ill-feeling rouse activity against something, while repugnance and fear lead to actions of withdrawal. The emotions which refer to an event seem to have their parallels among the emotions directed towards an agent. It is scarcely necessary to add that repugnance is distinct from mere dissatisfaction. The former is differentiated from the latter by its character as a conscious state, as well as by the nature of its conditions and results. The contrast between the behavior which is characteristic of each is specially marked.

Disgust is repugnance for the physically repulsive, and is therefore accompanied by actual or reproduced organic sensations. In moral disgust these sensations are suggested by analogy. Aversion, as ordinarily understood, is not merely the practical attitude of repugnance, but a feeling-attitude of a certain intensity. Detestation¹ is repugnance accompanied by

¹ Though the term properly implies repugnance, it is sometimes used to signify intense ill-feeling.

intermittent ill-feeling. Abhorrence is merely intense repugnance. Horror arises when the object is repulsive in an extraordinary degree. It involves general organic and mental disturbance, and thus resembles terror. The similarity is increased by the fact that in both cases the emotional element as such is overshadowed by its concomitants. There is also a resemblance between the modes of behavior characteristic of fear and repugnance. Moreover, since horror is often accompanied by the feeling of powerlessness, it may at times involve an element of fear.

5. Admiration and scorn are the peculiar emotional reactions which are conditioned by the recognition of worth and unworthiness respectively. They thus refer to some object which is considered as in some sense a real source of events and not as a mere medium of transmission; for that which simply transmits what it receives from without may have positive or negative value, but cannot be described as worthy or unworthy. Scorn and admiration are true aesthetic emotions, inasmuch as they have absolutely no connection with practical considerations. All emotions give rise to activity that may be called disinterested, but these are disinterested in their origin. We admire or scorn an object, not on account of its actual or possible effects, but because it is what it is. That the practical relations of the object are perfectly irrelevant, can be easily proved. We may admire a friend who benefits us, or an opponent who brings our hopes to grief; and we may scorn a rival for his incapacity even if this has rendered our own success possible. The modes of behavior which are peculiar to these emotions exhibit the same dissociation from the practical. Scorn prompts to disrespectful treatment of the object, and the opposite holds true of admiration.

Scorn is frequently accompanied by anger and almost invariably by pride.¹ The connection between scorn and pride is so natural that it tends to obscure the true nature of the former. Contempt implies that the unworthy object is ineffective from lack of power, and accordingly originates a form of

¹ Hume, *Treatise*, Selby-Bigge ed., p. 390.

conduct which is specifically distinct from that of scorn, though generically the same. It is naturally cooler and calmer than ordinary scorn, and is less apt to be associated with anger or pride. Disdain is simply a haughty mode of behavior with a modified scorn in the background. Scorn, disdain, and contempt, as commonly understood, are complex states, and as such are distinguishable from one another. When they are analyzed, however, they are found to contain the same feeling in reference to the unworthy. The term 'scorn' seems to be the most appropriate designation for this emotional element.

Admiration may contain humility, though the relation between the two is not so intimate as that which exists between scorn and pride. It has usually an appreciable hedonic coloring, for it is rarely violent, and the aesthetic pleasure which it involves can therefore come to consciousness. The most frequent concomitant of this emotion is wonder, since admiration is most readily excited by an object which exhibits worth in an extraordinary degree, and thus frequently refers to something which we do not fully understand. Indeed, the term sometimes signifies wonder and pleasure, or wonder, pleasure, and satisfaction. This is true of the so-called 'admiration' for the beautiful and the inanimate, unless there is an implied reference to the worth of some agent. The real emotion of worth, however, must be sharply differentiated from wonder and satisfaction. Admiration is not necessarily accompanied by wonder, nor is the latter always associated with the former. Wonder may be aroused by extraordinary unworthiness as well as by striking worth, and is in consequence not always so complimentary as admiration. In the case of satisfaction, also, the distinction is not less clear. We are satisfied with a thing on account of its relation to us; we admire an object solely because it is what it is. It is evident, too, that 'to admire' and 'to be satisfied with' are entirely different mental states.

6. Pride is usually taken to mean a permanent disposition, and as such does not concern us here. As a momentary state it may contain pleasure and self-satisfaction dependent on the sense of personal importance or worth. Habitual satisfaction

with self is called 'conceit.' While a high estimate of self may be dynamic, conceit is always static, since satisfaction inhibits all activity in reference to its object. Self-complacency is "a positive enjoyment in dwelling upon our own merits and belongings."¹ It is essentially hedonic, and must be distinguished from self-satisfaction. Vanity is delight in, and desire for, the approbation of others. Humility is a consciousness of inferiority or relative unimportance, along with acquiescence in this state of affairs. It therefore excludes self-dissatisfaction, and is not markedly unpleasant. Shame proper is primarily hedonic; it is the peculiarly disagreeable consciousness of degradation in the eyes of our fellows or of an ideal spectator. It is usually accompanied by embarrassment and confusion, *i.e.*, by discoördination and general disturbance. It is evident from what has been said that the self-feelings, though they may be accompanied by emotion, do not constitute any specific feeling-attitude. This seems inevitable when we remember that the self must take its place as one object among others before we can have any feeling in regard to it.

7. The intellectual feelings which require most careful treatment are surprise, astonishment, and wonder. Surprise is conditioned by the appearance of the unexpected, and is thus distinct from the mere feeling of novelty. The unlooked-for occurrence causes an abrupt stoppage in the intellectual activity going on at the moment; and, since it is not merely new but contrary to expectation, it also produces a more or less violent disturbance of previous adjustments. The sense of shock is, therefore, the characteristic element in surprise. Another constituent is the awareness of the fact that the unexpected has happened, and at times an element of bewilderment may also be present. Astonishment is excited, not by the unexpected as such, but by the utterly unaccountable. Astonishment may follow surprise, for the unexpected may turn out to be, for the time at least, absolutely unaccountable. The former, however, does not necessarily imply any previous expectation; hence it is not always preceded by the shock of surprise, and may develop

¹ Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 206.

gradually. It is the state of mind in which we feel that something is totally beyond our comprehension, and in which the recalcitrant element so dominates consciousness that we do not make any effort to render it intelligible. Wonder arises on the presentation of something that we do not fully understand, but which does not seem in itself unaccountable or unintelligible. The object is partly or vaguely understood, or, at all events, is felt to have intelligible relations to what we already know. Hence the characteristic feature of wonder is a vague groping, more imaginative than ratiocinative; and behind this dim questioning stands as a background the consciousness of the present obscurity of the object. Wonder is closely allied to curiosity and yet distinguishable from it. The sense of present ignorance is implicit in curiosity rather than explicit, while in wonder it influences the mind to such an extent that indolent imaginative conjectures take the place of active and definite inquiries. In short, curiosity is the desire to know definitely, while wonder is an abiding sense of present ignorance united with vague imaginative questioning. Wonder thus remains in the region of the dim and mysterious, and, while it may give place to active curiosity, the transition is often prevented by indolence or by the charm which vagueness and shadow sometimes possess. The relation between wonder and admiration has already been indicated. It is manifest that surprise, astonishment, wonder, and curiosity are not feelings in reference to an object. Curiosity is merely intellectual desire, and wonder is primarily intellectual. The chief elements in surprise and astonishment are disturbance and inhibition, and the other factors are intellectual. These states may be succeeded or accompanied by emotion, but in themselves are not emotional. The other so-called 'intellectual emotions,' such as the pain of contradiction and the pleasure of discovering identity in difference, are purely hedonic, and need not be discussed.

The aesthetic, moral, and religious feelings may be briefly dismissed. It can easily be proved that there is no special aesthetic emotion. A beautiful object excites pleasure and satisfaction directly, and by its associations gives rise to other

hedonic and emotional states. The direct factor in the feeling of beauty evidently does not involve any peculiar feeling-attitude towards the beautiful object; and, as might be expected, the same holds true of the indirect element. The feeling of the sublime may be analyzed into pleasure-pain and awe. The latter is simply the impression produced by an agent of overwhelming power. It is not a feeling in reference to an object, but a way in which we are affected. The feeling of the ludicrous is purely hedonic. In the case of the moral feelings the absence of any special moral emotion is still more marked. The moral emotions are nothing more than the ordinary emotions arising under specified circumstances. The religious sentiment is obviously a complex, the constituent elements of which differ with the individual and with circumstances. It may include joy, fear, affection, admiration in its highest form, humility, and awe. At the present stage of development the most distinctively religious feeling is probably reverence, and this may be analyzed into affection and humility.

The primary emotions, therefore, seem to be the following : satisfaction, dissatisfaction; anger; fear; ill-feeling, kindly feeling; repugnance; scorn, admiration. Each of these emotions is qualitatively distinct from the others, arises under special conditions, and has a characteristic function.

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